CER Directive (Critical Entities Resilience Directive)

CER Directive in context

Telecom threats range from opportunistic SMS phishing and SIM swap to nation-state grade location tracking and lawful-interception abuse. The common thread is that most attacks exploit the inherited trust model of legacy signaling. SS7 and Diameter were designed for a closed operator community that no longer exists.

Telecom networks depend on Internet-style routing (BGP, DNS, MPLS) for interconnect, transport and application delivery. Route hijacks and DNS abuse can degrade or intercept signaling as easily as any application-layer attack, which is why RPKI and DNSSEC are now standard hardening for carrier networks.

To place CER Directive in the wider telecom-security picture, review Cybersecurity, UEBA, BEREC, Egress, NRA and NIS2 Directive.

Related terms

• Cybersecurity
• UEBA
• BEREC
• Egress
• NRA
• NIS2 Directive
• ENISA
• CALEA

Related topic hubs

• Telecom Security Audit Structured MNO/MVNO security audit methodology.
• SS7 Penetration Testing Interconnect pentest methodology for SS7 signaling.
• Diameter Attacks S6a IDR/PUR/CLR abuse, subscriber tracking, LTE signaling attacks.
• Telecom Penetration Testing End-to-end telecom pentest across signaling, radio and core.

More from the TelcoSec Glossary

Browse the full TelcoSec Glossary, the Ultimate Guide to Mobile Network Security, or the P1 Arsenal of telecom-security tools.