STIR (Secure Telephone Identity Revisited)

Secure Telephone Identity Revisited is the IETF framework (RFCs 8224/8225/8226) for cryptographically signing the calling number in a SIP INVITE so that downstream networks can verify that the originating provider attested to the caller's right to use that number. STIR is the cryptographic engine underneath SHAKEN, the operational profile mandated by US and Canadian regulators to combat illegal robocalls and CLI spoofing. It depends on a healthy ecosystem of certificate authorities and policy administrators.

Categories: SignalingIdentity and SubscriberSecurity Controls

STIR in context

Signaling protocols carry the control-plane messages that set up calls, register subscribers and route SMS. SS7, Diameter, GTP-C and SIP are the four dominant families, and interconnect exposure of any of them is treated by GSMA as top-tier telecom risk.

Subscriber identifiers (IMSI, SUPI, MSISDN, IMEI) anchor authentication, charging and lawful interception. Any protocol that leaks a permanent identifier is treated as a privacy defect, which is why 5G introduced SUCI concealment on the air interface.

To place STIR in the wider telecom-security picture, review AAA, Any-Time Interrogation (ATI), CAP, IMSI, RCS and 1G — each entry cross-references back to this page so you can walk the topic in either direction.

Related terms

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