Paging Attacks

Paging attacks exploit the unauthenticated paging mechanism on the radio interface to detect, locate, or deny service to specific subscribers. By correlating paging messages addressed to a target's TMSI with controlled stimuli (silent SMS, missed calls), an attacker can confirm presence in a given tracking area or repeatedly drain the device's battery. 5G mitigates the worst variants by removing IMSI from paging and introducing 5G-S-TMSI, but configuration discipline remains essential.

Categories: Radio Access NetworkIdentity and SubscriberThreats and Attacks

Paging Attacks in context

The radio access network is where mobile devices attach to the operator's infrastructure. Attacks in this layer include IMSI catching, rogue base stations and downgrade attacks; defenses rest on mutual authentication, integrity-protected signaling and Open RAN supply-chain hygiene.

Subscriber identifiers (IMSI, SUPI, MSISDN, IMEI) anchor authentication, charging and lawful interception. Any protocol that leaks a permanent identifier is treated as a privacy defect, which is why 5G introduced SUCI concealment on the air interface.

To place Paging Attacks in the wider telecom-security picture, review Cell Phone (Mobile Phone), CPE, Firmware, IMEI, IRSF and Malware — each entry cross-references back to this page so you can walk the topic in either direction.

Related terms

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