Paging Attacks

Paging attacks exploit the unauthenticated paging mechanism on the radio interface to detect, locate, or deny service to specific subscribers. By correlating paging messages addressed to a target's TMSI with controlled stimuli (silent SMS, missed calls), an attacker can confirm presence in a given tracking area or repeatedly drain the device's battery. 5G mitigates the worst variants by removing IMSI from paging and introducing 5G-S-TMSI, but configuration discipline remains essential.

Categories: Radio Access NetworkIdentity and SubscriberThreats and Attacks

Paging Attacks in context

The radio access network is the layer where mobile devices attach to the operator's infrastructure. Attacks in this layer include IMSI catching, rogue base stations, downgrade attacks and jamming, and defenses hinge on mutual authentication, integrity-protected signaling and Open RAN supply-chain hygiene.

Subscriber identifiers (IMSI, SUPI, MSISDN, IMEI) are the anchor for authentication, charging, lawful interception and fraud analytics. Any protocol or interface that leaks a permanent identifier is treated as a serious privacy defect, which is why 5G introduced SUCI concealment on the air interface.

To place Paging Attacks in the wider telecom-security picture, review Piercer Attack, IMEI, Torpedo Attack, BTS Impersonation (Fake BTS), Cell Phone (Mobile Phone) and CPE.

Related terms

Related topic hubs

  • Diameter Attacks S6a IDR/PUR/CLR abuse, subscriber tracking, LTE signaling attacks.
  • SMS Firewall SMS spam, phishing, A2P bypass and MAP-layer SMS filtering.
  • Signaling Firewall Unified SS7/Diameter/GTP/SMS signaling firewall framework.
  • 5G Security 5G SBA, SEPP, SUCI, 5G-AKA, N32 and service-based interface security.

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